U.S. Senator John Curtis, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, today led a hearing examining the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy and its renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere as a cornerstone of American national security. The hearing—which included Ambassador Michael Kozak, State Department Senior Bureau Official for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as the witness—examined the State Department’s efforts to strengthen regional partnerships, counter authoritarian influence, and promote stability throughout the Americas. The Senator’s questioning focused on objectives to counter China’s growing influence across Latin America and reinforce American leadership in the region.
At the hearing, Curtis highlighted recent successes following Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s engagement with Panama, including Panama’s decision to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the transfer of key Panama Canal port assets from Hong Kong-based operators to a U.S.-led consortium.
He also asked Ambassador Kozak how those developments could serve as a model for reducing China’s influence elsewhere in the hemisphere. Kozak emphasized that many countries have become increasingly aware of the risks associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including predatory lending practices and strategic investments that undermine national sovereignty.
Video of Senator Curtis’ opening remarks and line of questioning can be found here, and a transcript of his opening remarks and initial questioning is below:
Opening remarks, as prepared:
This hearing is to examine how the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere. In other words, what is the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” as it has been termed.
For too long, American policy has treated our own neighborhood as an afterthought while our adversaries have treated it as an opportunity. The National Security Strategy makes a welcome correction by putting the Western Hemisphere near the center of American national security policy.
It is right that the United States should focus first on the safety, security, and prosperity of the American people, and frequently that means focusing on the security of our region. That means securing our border, stopping deadly drugs before they enter our communities, strengthening supply chains closer to home, and ensuring that hostile powers cannot control strategic assets in our own hemisphere.
In many ways, the real test of our Western Hemisphere strategy is whether it can blunt and roll back the presence of our global adversaries—China, Russia, and Iran—within our backyard. China has spent years building influence through ports, telecommunications, infrastructure, natural resources, surveillance technology, and diplomatic pressure.
Russia has used Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua to project influence and challenge U.S. interests from within the hemisphere. Iran and its proxies have also sought footholds through malign networks and anti-American regimes—which is why the Committee has passed my bills, the No Hezbollah In Our Hemisphere Act and BANNED in Latin America Act, which push back on these networks. The National Security Strategy is right to say that non-hemispheric competitors should not be allowed to position forces, threatening capabilities, or control strategically vital assets in our hemisphere.
The Maduro raid was exactly this principle put into practice. Nicolas Maduro’s regime had been a platform for Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and criminal influence in our hemisphere. His regime destabilized neighbors, fueled migration, enriched corrupt networks, cooperated with malign outside powers, and allowed drug trafficking and other illicit activity to flourish.
We were not going to let what amounted to an illegitimate Russian puppet government corruptly cling to power and operate within our backyard. And now Maduro resides in a prison in New York. And now, we are beginning to see early signs of change inside Venezuela. Hundreds of political prisoners have been released, opposition figures are able to organize more openly, Venezuelan oil is no longer being exclusively used to support China, and there are signs of shifts within the governing structure, including the removal of some Maduro loyalists. Venezuela today is thankfully in a much different place than it was a year ago.
However, Congress is going to be interested in what the path now looks like for Venezuela from here to a democratic transition.
Progress has been made throughout the region on the diplomatic front as well. After Secretary Rubio’s visit, Panama announced that it would move to leave China’s Belt and Road Initiative. We also saw the announced sale of port assets operated by Hong Kong-based entities at both ends of the Panama Canal to a U.S.-led consortium.
Those developments should be seen as examples of the kind of strategic competition the United States can win when we are focused, engaged, and willing to use diplomatic and commercial tools together. We should encourage more countries in the region to take similar steps.
I am broadly supportive of this renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere and the recognition that what happens in our neighborhood directly affects the security of the American people. But support does not relieve us of our responsibility to conduct oversight. Congress has a duty to ask hard questions about strategy, legal authorities, coordination with regional partners, and what comes next. And we must ensure that a stronger focus on our own hemisphere does not come at the expense of American leadership elsewhere. Strength at home and in our neighborhood should reinforce—not replace—our engagement in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East.
The goal is not hemispheric seclusion, but strategic prioritization rooted in American strength.
I look forward to hearing from Ambassador Kozak on how the State Department is implementing this strategy, how we are coordinating across the interagency, and how Congress can help ensure the United States remains the partner of first choice in our own hemisphere.
Questioning:
Senator Curtis: After Secretary Rubio’s visit to Panama, they announced they would move to leave China’s Belt and Road Initiative. We also saw the announced sale of the Panama Canal port assets operated by Hong Kong-based entities to a U.S.-led consortium. Are there lessons we can draw from Panama about how the United States can use diplomacy, commercial engagement, and strategic clarity to roll back China’s influence in the region? And part two: Are there other countries in the hemisphere where you believe a similar approach might be equally successful?
Ambassador Michael Kozak: Yes. Thank you, Chairman. I would say there are some good lessons out of it. Each situation is somewhat different, but Panama had come to its own conclusion that being part of the Belt and Road Initiative was more liability than gain, so they told us they were ready to leave.
They also had their comptroller look into the way those port concessions had been granted and found a great deal of fraud and failure to implement the agreement. So, their Supreme Court took action there. I think what was key, though, was that China then attempted to intimidate them by doing inspections and detaining their Panama-flagged vessels in Chinese ports, and so on.
Panama needed a little backup and got it from countries in the region. The countries that joined the Shield of the Americas, by and large, issued statements standing in solidarity with Panama against that threat from China. But we’ve also seen, in other parts of the region, the Chinese try to move in. For example, in some places they’ll go directly to a university and say, “We’ll donate a telescope to you so you can do high-level research.” It turns out the telescope is really designed to spy on American satellites and other things like that. They bypass the national government. We’ve had some success talking directly with subnational groups. We’ve also had success dealing with national governments or urging national governments throughout the region to adopt investment-screening mechanisms.
Curtis: Yeah, let me bore down on that a little bit. Because you kind of hit on one of the questions I want to ask, which is this China strategy. You’ve mentioned a couple of things. I think the loans that become predatory and that they then foreclose on—I mean, there’s quite a long list. Your answer on Panama is interesting. I guess let me come back to this concept. If that’s what brought clarity to Panama, how do we bring clarity to these other countries—not just with elected officials, but with the voters, the constituents, who tend to see all of this coming from China and know the state’s not doing anything? The reality is that we have this little thing called the rule of law, and we do things differently. We’re far more transparent, and the way we help isn’t always seen the way China seems to be seen. So, what would you suggest, particularly from a congressional role, about how we get better clarity on what China is doing and also get better credit for what we’re doing when we’re doing good things?
Kozak: I think it’s super important to get people sensitized to this. At the beginning, governments didn’t realize how predatory the Chinese loan strategy was. They’ve now learned by adverse experience. What we’ve been trying to do—and this goes back to the last time I had this job—is publicize throughout the region just the facts. We’re not saying don’t engage with China. We still buy things from China. But we’re saying, “Look at what happens to you if you get into this kind of a deal. Don’t enter into it on their terms.”
That’s been quite successful, certainly at the national government level, though not as much with the populations at large. We’ve been trying to do more public relations, and I think anything Congress can do to bring focus to this would help.
One of the things we did, which I mentioned in my testimony, was these restrictions on visas. Basically, members of legislatures, judiciaries, labor unions, and others in foreign countries who take bribes from the Chinese—or other forms of compensation—and act as agents for China by pushing some of this activity… The Administration has said, if you’re going to do that, you’re not welcome here anymore. We’re not going to give you or your family visas to come to the United States. We tried this originally in Central America. It worked very well. We’ve now expanded it to the whole hemisphere.
Curtis: It seems like stronger coordination between Congress and State, as we go into those countries—knowing which messages to carry and which things to point out—might also be helpful.
